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I.

INTRODUCTION

This reply is filed by the State of Washington as a legal response to
Plaintiff/Respondents' 2014 Post-Budget Filing (Plfs' 2014 Resp.), as
permitted by the Court in a letter dated May 1, 2014.

It is not a

supplement to the Legislature's Report filed on April 30.
The State has not achieved full implementation of the reforms
scheduled for phase-in by 2018. However, it has demonstrated that, with
guidance from the Court, there is momentum toward finding the political
consensus needed to complete the task. Plaintiffs have made creative
arguments claiming the State has failed to implement reforms that it
actually has implemented, and they have woven an illusion of precedent
for an array of sanctions that actually are without precedent. This State's
judicial, legislative, and executive branches all share the goal of achieving
full article IX compliance through implementation of the reforms
embodied in Engrossed Substitute House Bill 2261 (ESHB 2261) and
subsequent education reform legislation.

The imposition of sanctions

would not advance this shared goal.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 5, 2012, this Court issued a decision holding that the
State was not meeting its obligation to amply provide for the education of
all children within its borders as required in article IX, section 1 of the

state constitution. McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d. 477, 545-46, 269 P.3d
227 (2012). The Court rejected both the trial court's remedy ordering
another study and Plaintiffs' proposed remedy requiring full compliance at
the end of the next school year (2011-12). !d. at 541-46. Instead, the
Court endorsed the

Legislature's

enacted reforms

embodied in

ESHB 2261 (Laws of 2009, ch. 548) and subsequent legislation, which
contemplated implementation by 2018. The Court retained jurisdiction to
"monitor implementation of the reforms under ESHB 2261, and more
generally, the State's compliance with its paramount duty," with the
express goal of "fostering dialogue and cooperation between coordinate
branches of state government in facilitating the constitutionally required
reforms." McCleary, 173 Wn.2d. at 543-46. The Court did not specify
which actions must be taken by the 2012 Legislature; neither did it attempt
to set specific priorities.
In July 2012, after the legislative session had concluded, the Court
issued a procedural order for its retained jurisdiction, which provided for
annual legislative reports to the Court, followed by comments filed by
Plaintiffs. McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, Order at 2 (July 18, 2012).
The Court declined to "measure the steps taken in each legislative session
between 2012 and 2018 against full constitutional compliance," but

2

indicated that the State must "show real and measurable progress" toward
achieving full compliance. !d. at 3.
The 2013 Legislature appropriated new funding for basic education
during the 2013-15 bie1mhm1, as summarized in its 2013 report to the
Court. 1 The Court responded by acknowledging the "meaningful steps"
the 2013 Legislature had taken to address funding for education, but
criticized the amount and extent of progress, suggesting possible harsh
enforcement actions in the near term. McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7,
Order (Jan. 9, 2014). The Court ordered the State to submit its next report
by April 30, 2014, containing "a complete plan for fully implementing its
program of basic education for each school year between now and the
2017-18 school year" that addresses "each of the areas of K-12 education
identified in ESBH 2261, as well as the implementation plan called for by
SHB 2776 [Laws of2010, ch. 236]" that includes "a phase-in schedule for
fully funding each of the components of basic education." !d. at 8.
The Legislature, through the Article IX Committee, submitted its
report on April 30, 2014.Z

1

Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select Committee
on Article IX Litigation (Aug. 29, 2013) (Leg. 2013 Report).
2

Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select Committee
on Article IX Litigation (Apr. 30, 2014) (Leg. 2014 Report).
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III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs Misrepresent the Status of Implementation and Seek
to Relitigate Funding Formulas This Court Already Approved

In their haste to assign "three strikes" in support of a punitive order
against the Legislature, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the implementation the
State has accomplished to date. Their continued assertion that the State
has been stalling for 36 years is an example of false hyperbole that serves
no useful purpose. "Reform has been continual since [the Seattle School
District case] and neither the Legislature's commitment nor its sincerity in
addressing .this perennial problem should be in doubt." CP 2932 (Trial
Court, FF 239). Plaintiffs' efforts reflect a desire to relitigate portions of
the case and, rather than accept the timeline the Court established, to
continue their quest for immediate implementation. The Court retained
jurisdiction to monitor the State's implementation of the financial reforms
adopted in ESHB 2261, not to relitigate the funding formulas adopted in
that bill.
In its McCleary decision, the Court endorsed reform legislation
initiated by ESHB 2261 and its foundational work as an appropriate
remedy, provided it is implemented. McCleary, at 542. According to an
unchallenged finding of fact from the trial court, ESHB 2261 was
endorsed by "educators, school districts and by state and local officials,"
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including persons and entities who are Plaintiffs in this case. CP 2935
(Trial Court, FF 249); see also McCleary, at 544 (quoting Superintendent
of Public Instruction). Under ESHB 2261, actual costs are provided for
through a prospective allocation model rather than through reimbursement
of expenditures. McCleary, at 541-42; Leg. 2014 Report at 40.
Moreover, the Legislature has not overstated in any of its reports to
the Court the extent or degree to which it has implemented the reforms
initiated in ESHB 2261. Thus far, it has not let pass any specific deadline
enacted in SHB 2776. Because implementation is an ongoing process, and
because the filings by the parties each year build upon previous filings, it
is necessary to correct some misperceptions perpetuated in Plaintiffs'
filings.
1.

The Highly Capable Program is Fully Funded

Plaintiffs argue, for example, that the State did not demonstrate
any progress in 2014 toward fully funding the Highly Capable program.
Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 23.
program

is

fully

The reason is simple:

funded.

Under

the

the Highly Capable

formula

specified

in

RCW 28A.150.260(1 0)( c), the Legislature appropriates funding to support
programs for highly capable students. It appropriated $19,232,000 for the
2013-15 biennium to fully fund the amount required by the formula. Laws
of 2013, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 4, § 511. Plaintiffs do not explain why the

5

appropriation is insufficient. They supply nothing in the way of evidence
or credible argument that the program is anything less than fully funded.
Instead, they reference regulations adopted by OSPI to implement the
program that is now part of basic education.

Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 23:

These regulations require school districts to provide services for the most
highly capable students.

RCW 28A.150.260(10)(c); WAC 392-170.

Districts continue to receive additional funding for providing these
services.
2.

Reforming Basic Education to Implement 24 Credits for
Graduation Did Not Violate Any Court Order

In 2014, the Legislature responded to school district and educator
requests to convert increased hours to increased credits. Leg. 2014 Report
at 18-24. Plaintiffs treat the Legislature's responsiveness as a failure to
comply with a Court Order. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 24-26. It is not. As
explained in the Legislature's 2014 Report, and as Plaintiffs concede, 3 the
Legislature made an educational policy decision that had consensus in the
educational community.

It enhanced the prototypical school funding

model by, for example, reducing laboratory class sizes and increasing the
high school allocation for materials, supplies, and operating costs (MSOC)
to further support Career and College Ready Graduation Requirements.

3

Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 25.

6

Leg. 2014 Report at 22-23. It also provided flexibility to school districts
on minimum hour requirements. That reallocation of dollars violates no
order of the Court. Rather it effectuates the shared expectation that the
Legislature will continue to review and revise the basic education program
as needed. McCleary, at 526-27; RCW 28A.150.1981.
3.

The Pupil Transportation Formula
Implemented for the2014-15 School Year

is

Fully

ESHB 2261 included a new "expected cost model" formula for
Pupil Transportation, predicting costs using a regression analysis based on
the number of students transported and a set of statistically significant
characteristics for each district.

RCW 28A.160.180.

"The Office of

Financial Management (OFM), with the help of consultants, developed a
new pupil transportation funding model which was then adopted in
ESHB 2261." Quality Education Council Initial Report to the Governor,
January 13, 2010 (2010 QEC Report) at p. 4. 4 Under SHB 2776, the plan
was for the new formula to be phased in until fully implemented during
the 2013-15 biennium. RCW 28A.l60.192. It will be fully implemented
for the first time for the 2014-15 school year.

The Legislature

appropriated funding in the 2013-15 biennial budget sufficient to cover 40
percent of the gap between the 2011-12 baseline and full funding in the
4

Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 22, n. 68; http://www.kl2.wa.us/QEC/pubdocs/QEC2010

report. pdf.
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2013-14 school year, ramping up to full implementation for the 2014-15
school year. Laws of 2013, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 4, § 505(2); Leg. 2013
Report at 12-13.

In the 2014 supplemental budget, the Legislature

increased the initial FY 2015 appropriation from $427,408,000 to
$429,312,000, including a set-aside of $558,000 for anomalies not
addressed by the formula, such as a district's unusual geographical
configuration. Districts that meet a minimum efficiency rating and can
demonstrate their actual prior year costs exceed the. expected cost
allocations due to exceptional circumstances are eligible for additional
money from this set-aside. Laws of2014, ch. 221, § 503(3).
The plaintiffs are incorrect in their 2014 Response (which by and
large cites as authority their incorrect 2013 Response) in suggesting that
the new funding formula is legally flawed or that full implementation will
not be achieved for the 2014-15 school year. First, this Court accepted
ESHB 2261 as a valid attempt to account for actual costs of the state
program. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate that issue here,
where the Court is monitoring implementation, not reassessing the statute.
Second, Plaintiffs have provided the Court with no credible evidence from
which it can possibly conclude that the $429,312,000 appropriated for
FY 2015, plus any 2015 supplemental amount, will fail to fully implement
pupil transportation.

8

Citing their own 2013 Response, Plaintiffs claim the State must be
failing to take into account assumed rising fuel costs. But, neither their
2013 Response nor their 2014 Response contains any evidence related to
fuel costs or evidence that the expected cost formula fails to adequately
account for fuel costs within its statistical analysis.
Plaintiffs also claim various state documents show underfunding.
They do nothing of the sort. None of the documents cherry-picked by
Plaintiffs "show" underfunding of transportation for the 2014-15 school
year-not the March 2013 OSPI "Implementation of the New Student
Transportation Funding System" status update, 5 not the 2010 QEC Report,
and not the documents cited in footnote 56 of their 2014 Response. 6 None
of those documents rely on updated data inputs.

Anticipated cost

estimates can swing wildly when attempting to project the enrollments of

5

Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 17, n.54 (citingPlfs' 2013 Resp. at24-25, n. 75).

6

Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 8, n.56. In their footnote, Plaintiffs cite a report of
expenditures by school districts for 2012-13 as being greater than an estimated total for
2014-15 found in a preliminary transportation allocation spreadsheet compiled by OSPI.
Regarding the expenditures document, there is no foundation for determining whether
expenditures coincide with eligible services. Regarding the transportation allocation
spreadsheet, there is no foundation for the context of the estimates. The Court is
provided no information on how the estimates may change with actual, audited data that
may provide a basis for supplemental budget requests. Indeed, the face of the document
explicitly cautions that "[t]he adjustment to actual will be made in the February 2015
apportionment. Adjustments will be made based on reported student counts and route
data. The formula coefficients will be adjusted based on statewide reported data from the
2013-14 school year." http://www.k12.wa.us/safsiMisc/BudPrep14/Estimated%201415%20Transportation%20Allocations.xlsx. In sum, there is no evidence to suggest any
underfunding of whatever OSPI ultimately supplies as the proper cost amount based on
the formula.

9

roughly one million students, inflation rates, and other factors into the
future. The Legislature's 2014 Report explains the difference between
formula changes and updated data or variables that are inputs to the
fommla. Leg. 2014 Repmi at 13, 49-50. The outputs of the state funding
process are necessarily fluid as the State steadily updates the model with
actual audited data from school districts and adjusts apportionment
accordingly. Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Id. 7
Plaintiffs point to the projection in the March 2013 OSPI
Transportation Status Update that, if the transportation formula were to be
fully funded at $375.1 million, funding would be something less than 100
percent of all districts' 2012-13 school year expenditures. Once again,
this document tells the Court nothing about the relationship of those
school districts' expenditures to appropriate services, costs, or efficiencies.
It provides no information on student enrollment counts and thus no
information on the costs for the 2014-15 school year. It provides no basis
to conclude that the $429.3 million appropriated for student transportation
for FY 2015 will fail to accomplish full implementation of the

7

Plaintiffs in Montoy v. Kansas, 282 Kan. 9, 138 P.3d 755 (2006) (Montoy IV),
similarly argued that the court should rely on findings and conclusions contained in a cost
study prepared for the legislature as it responded to judicial orders regarding public
school funding. The court instead deferred to the legislature's treatment of the study,
concluding that it should not consider the report to be "substantial competent evidence of
the actual and necessary costs of providing a suitable education" because the cost study
had not been subjected to the fact-fmding processes of litigation. Id. at 21.
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transportation funding model, particularly in light of the extra set-aside for
formula anomalies.
The components of basic education that must be fully implemented
are identified in the Court's January 8, 2012, decision. The Legislature's
Reports to the Court have accurately reported its implementation progress.
Plaintiffs' attempts to discredit the Reports are veiled attempts to relitigate
portions of this case. Plaintiffs are arguing as if the Court ordered the
State to implement a reimbursement model rather than the reformed
allocation formulas embodied in ESHB 2261.

B.

Any Order Imposed by the Court Should Further the Goal of
Achieving Ample Funding for Education
No sanction is necessary to compel constitutional compliance.

There is agreement between the Legislature and the Court that basic
education must be amply funded.

While there is not current political

consensus on how best to achieve that end, there is progress toward
resolution and preparation for significant work in the 2015 legislative
session. Leg. 2014 Report at 25-33.
Nevertheless, throughout this litigation, Plaintiffs have sought an
order forcing immediate action by the Legislature. This Court properly
rejected that request, recognizing its decision imposed on the Legislature a
complex and challenging set of tasks that would require more than a single
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legislative session to resolve. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545-47. The Court
adopted the 2018 deadline the Legislature had set for itself to accomplish
the tasks set before it and declined to establish intermediate benchmarks
for assessing compliance.

Id.

at 549 (Madsen, C.J., concurring/

dissenting). See also McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, Order at 3 (July 18,
2012) (order regarding retained jurisdiction; "it is not realistic to measure
the steps taken in each legislative session between 2012 and 2018 against
full constitutional compliance").
Accomplishing reform of this magnitude takes time to build
political consensus; to evaluate existing education programs and modify
them as necessary to incorporate updated information; to identify or
develop appropriate reliable revenue sources; and to draft, consider, and
enact implementing legislation.

But the Plaintiffs' repeated call for

immediate compliance has proved a clever litigation strategy, because
anything other than immediate compliance can be characterized as
intentional delay.
The Legislature's decision not to adopt the reimbursement model
Plaintiffs have advocated does not demonstrate resistance to the Court or
to the constitutional duty to amply fund education.

Under Plaintiffs'

model, the state is virtually obligated to pay whatever amount of money
each of the 295 independent school districts believes is necessary. That is
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not a model for effectiveness, efficiency, or accountability, and it has not
been mandated by the Court.
Nevertheless, as is their pattern, Plaintiffs respond by agam
advocating sanctions. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 46-49. Compare Plfs' 2013
Resp. at 45-48; Plfs' 2012 Resp. at 42-43. Their request for sanctions
reflects their refusal to accept this Court's denial of their request to require
"full funding" immediately. It also reflects their tiresome contention that
the Legislature-like former Governor George Wallace-is obstinately
refusing to meet its constitutional duty. This is not Alabama in 1963 and
Plaintiffs' continuing and repeated comparisons to segregationists is
offensive and unproductive.
The Legislature has made it clear through its reports to the Court
that it is working to comply with article IX, section 1. As explained
above, it has made measurable progress toward ultimate compliance. Its
2014 Report acknowledges that the Legislature did not formally adopt a
plan in response to the Order of January 9, 2014. But Plaintiffs' attempt to
wrap that failure in a cloak of constitutional noncompliance, institutional
recalcitrance, and offensive historical comparisons should be flatly and
unequivocally rejected.
No sanction should be issued. The Legislature is well aware of its
constitutional duty and is moving toward completion of the task by the
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2018 deadline this Court established.

Imposing the type of onerous

sanction Plaintiffs advocate would create distraction and slow progress.
Nonetheless, were the Court inclined to consider a sanction, any
sanction must lie within the Court's constitutional authority and should
advance the goal of achieving compliance with article IX, section 1 by
2018. The sanctions proposed or contemplated by Plaintiffs do not meet
those two criteria.
1.

Contempt Order Against Legislature or Legislators

Plaintiffs suggest the Court should hold "the governmental body or
elected officials" in contempt of court. Plfs' 2014 Resp at 47, 49. We
have found no case in which this Court has issued a contempt order
against the Legislature or against any legislator. This Court has decided
contempt proceedings as original actions for violations of its own orders, 8
but the Court has never held the Legislature or a legislator in contempt for
any such violation. The Court has considered contempt orders against
executive branch officers and agencies 9 and against a city, 10 but not
against the Legislature or a legislator.

8

See, e.g., In re Koome, 82 Wn.2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973) (respondent
violated stay); State v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 478, 169 P. 980 (1918) (respondents failed to
comply with order to surrender possession of property).
9

See, e.g., State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 841-43, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001)
(reversing court of appeals order to impose remedial contempt on state patrol because
superior court had reversed order at issue); Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 251, 543
P.2d 325 (1975) (delaying consideration of request to hold agency head in contempt, as

14

None of the cases Plaintiffs cite provide precedent for this Court to
hold the Legislature in contempt, and we have found no case where any
state's highest court issued or affirmed contempt sanctions against that
state's own legislature. All of the cases Plaintiffs cite are federal cases
and none involves a state legislature or implicates separation of powers
among co-equal branches of state government. 11

alternative to mandamus) (no finding of contempt or order of mandamus was issued, see
Bresolin v. Morris, 88 Wn.2d 167, 558 P.2d 1350 (1977)).
10

See RIL Associates, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wn.2d 402, 780 P.2d 838
(1989) (affirming judgment of contempt against city for deliberately violating a
permanent injunction).
11

In Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d
470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982), the court held that neither the Eleventh
Amendment, nor "concerns for our federal system," nor the language of the Clean Air
Act barred a civil contempt sanction against the state to enforce a consent judgment in an
action brought by the United States against the state. Id. at 475-77. At issue was an
automobile emissions control program the state legislature refused to fund; the remedy
imposed for contempt was the withholding of federal highway funds. Id. at 478-79.
In Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943
(1977), the court declined to vacate a contempt order against state executive branch
officials who defied a district court order enjoining them from summarily seizin,g mental
patients' property, and then failed to make payments agreed to in a subsequent consent
judgment. The court of appeals rejected the state officials' procedural and institutional
arguments and held that Eleventh Amendment immunity had been waived. Id. at 155-59.
In U.S. v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 1988), the United States
sued the city for intentionally maintaining racial segregation in residential areas and
schools. The city ultimately entered into a consent judgment, but the city council refused
to enact a public housing ordinance it had agreed to. The district court held the city and
the four council members who voted against the ordinance in contempt and imposed
financial sanctions. The court of appeals affirmed, primarily because the city-through
the city council-had agreed to the terms of the consent judgment. I d. at 454. However,
the Supreme Court reversed because (1) the city councilmembers were not named as
parties, (2) imposition of sanctions against individual councilmembers was
"extraordinary" and should not have been imposed until sanctions imposed on the city
alone failed to secure compliance, and (3) considerations supporting the legislative
immunity doctrine must inform the court's discretion in imposing sanctions. Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265,280, 110 S. Ct. 625, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1990).
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As explained in footnote 11, one of the federal cases Plaintiffs
cited was reversed by the United States Supreme Court citing, inter alia,
considerations underlying the legislative immunity doctrine. The doctrine
of legislative immunity does not, of course, prevent this Court from
determining the constitutionality of the Legislature's actions and ordering
compliance.

That power is beyond question.

But not all remedies

ordinarily available to a court in civil litigation are consistent with the
separation of powers and the independence afforded the Legislature and its
members under our constitutional scheme.

When the Washington

Constitution was adopted, for example, the federal Speech or Debate
Clause was understood to protect legislators from any liability or judicial
action for their legislative votes. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
204, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880). The framers of our Constitution presumably
shared that understanding when adopting a state speech and debate clause
in article II, section 17, such that a contempt order directed at legislative
actions of individual legislators would contravene article II, section 17.

Plaintiffs also cite Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d
522 (1978), but that case did not involve a contempt proceeding. At issue was whether,
under the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could order that attorney fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 be paid from public funds. Id. at 690-91. The Court discussed
contempt only for comparison, concluding that the award of attorney fees for bad faith
served the same purpose as a remedial fme imposed for civil contempt. !d. at 691.
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2.

Order Prohibiting State Expenditures

Plaintiffs suggest the Court could prohibit the Legislature from
making expenditures for non-educational programs until the court's
constitutional ruling is complied with. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. They offer
no suggestion as to what expenditures should or could be prohibited or on
what basis, and they display no concern for the public value of other
programs and services or for the citizens who rely on them. Again, they
cite only federal cases, none of which prohibited spending on unrelated
programs, and none of which involved a state legislature or implicated
. of powers. 12
separatiOn

12

In two of the cited cases, black residents prevailed in actions alleging their
cities had discriminated against black neighborhoods in providing certain city services.
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981), ajj'd in part and
reversed and remanded in part, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of
Kissimmee, Fla., 645 F. Supp. 571, 589 (M.D. Fla. 1986). In both cases, the district court
declined to order the city to institute specific programs or construction projects in black
neighborhoods, but enjoined the city from spending any funds on the construction or
improvement of municipal services in white neighborhoods until the services in black
neighborhoods were on par with those in white neighborhoods. Dowdell, 511 F. Supp. at
1384; Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 588-89. The relief in Baker was patterned after that in
Dowdell. Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 589.
The other case cited by Plaintiffs is a discrimination case challenging racial
segregation in Virginia public schools. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty.,
377 U.S. 218, 84 S. Ct. 1226, 12 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1964). In response to earlier court
decisions, the state had tried various means to preserve segregated schools, ultimately
settling on a program that repealed compulsory public education, made school attendance
a matter of local option, and provided tuition grants for private schools. !d. at 222. After
a court ordered the public schools in Prince Edward County to admit students without
regard to race, the county supervisors refused to levy school taxes, closed the schools,
and passed ordinances to provide fmancial support for segregated private schools.
Griffin, at 222. The Supreme Court held the county's action violated equal protection
and affirmed the district court's injunction barring fmancial support for private schools
while public schools remain closed. !d. at 233.
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3.

Order Requiring State Expenditures

Plaintiffs suggest the Court could order the Legislature to pass
legislation to provide specific funding. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. Three of
the cases they cite are federal school desegregation cases that invoke
federal rights and the Supremacy Clause, but not separation of powers. 13
13

One of the cases, Griffin, is discussed above in footnote 12. Faced with an
unrepentant and recalcitrant school system in that case, the Supreme Court stated in
dictum that the district court may, if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination,
require county legislators to "exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise
funds" adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain a nondiscriminatory public school
system. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added). The Court did not authorize the
district court to assume the legislative function.
In Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 109 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1990),
the Court again was faced with a segregated school system. After several attempts to
devise a remedy that would ensure funding for the desegregation plan, the district court
ordered a property tax increase and the issuance of capital improvement bonds. I d at 4142. The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion. Id at 52. "In
assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate power of taxation the District Court not
only intruded on local authority but circumvented it altogether." Id. at 51. The Court
made a broader observation:
"The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a ...
public school system suggests that there will be more than one
constitutionally permissible method of solving them, and that . . . the
legislature's efforts to tackle the problems should be entitled to
respect."
Id. at 52 (quoting San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42, 93 S. Ct.
1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973) (internal quotes omitted)).
In Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 712 F.2d 809 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom Griffin v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Buffalo, N.Y., 466 U.S.
936 (1984), city officialsdeclined to fund the cost of implementing certain desegregation
efforts ordered by the district court. The district court found that the board of education
had demonstrated the need for additional money to carry out the desegregation orders and
that city officials had made no effort to ascertain what funds were needed, and it ordered ·
the city to provide the funds. Id at 478-79, 484.
Interestingly, counsel for the plaintiff parents declined to defend the district
court's order on appeal, because he believed school boards operating under desegregation
orders were using the orders to pursue "their private agendas of unmet educational
needs," and then blaming advocates of school desegregation for the added fmancial
burdens courts were imposing. Arthur, 712 F.2d at 813.
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The single state case they cite provides only a cursory analysis of
separation of powers in determining a remedy.

They cite no case

supporting judicial control over the enactment of legislation.
Plaintiffs cite one decision in a long-running dispute over
education funding in Kansas, but do not provide context. The Kansas
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court ruling that the legislature had not
made "suitable provision" for financing public schools, as required in the
state constitution, but it then stopped: "We do not dictate the precise way
in which the legislature must fulfill its constitutional duty. That is for the
legislators to decide, consistent with the Kansas Constitution." Montoy v.
Kansas, 278 Kan. 769, 775, 120 P.3d 306 (2005) (Montoy II).

The Kansas Legislature responded by adopting legislation, which
the court found inadequate in Montoy v. Kansas, 279 Kan. 817, 112 P.3d
923 (2005) (Montoy III).

The court dismissed separation of powers

concerns in reliance on a student note in a law review arguing that
equitable

power

is

appropriate

if

exercised

after

legislative

noncompliance. Jd. at 828-29. Finding a need for immediate relief, the
court ordered the legislature to increase funding for the upcoming school
year by at least $285 million. Montoy III, at 845. 14 A month later, the

14

It is this part of this single decision that Plaintiffs cite. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47
(citing Plfs' 2013 Resp. at 46 n.137).
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court approved a legislative increase of half that amount.

Montoy v.

Kansas, 282 Kan. 9, 15, 138 P.3d 755 (2006) (Montoy IV) (citing
unpublished order).
During its next session the legislature revised its school finance
formula, adding additional funding. The court held the legislature had
complied with the court's previous orders, and remanded with directions
to dismiss the action. Id. at 24-25, 26-27. 15
Read together, the Montoy decisions show a pattern of deference to
the legislative's constitutional role.

4.

Order Requiring Sale of State Property

Plaintiffs suggest the Court could order the sale of state property to
fund constitutional compliance. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. 16 They offer no
examples, of course, of property that might be sold. Neither do they offer

15

The court declined to consider the constitutionality of the new legislation,
holding that it must be challenged in a new action in the trial court:
We have already made the determination that the school fmance
formula which was before this court in Montoy II was unconstitutional.
The school fmance system we review today is not the system we
reviewed in Montoy II or Montoy Ill. The sole issue now before this
court is whether the [legislative acts] comply with the previous orders
of this court. If they do then our inquiry ends and this case must be
dismissed.
Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 18-19.
16

Plaintiffs cite a single case in support of this remedy, but they mischaracterize
it. In Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Ohio 1979), the court did not order the sale
of any state property; rather, it ordered that the proceeds of excess property that the state
already had advertised for sale must be used to help pay for a school transportation
system to comply with desegregation orders.
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any explanation as to how the one-time sale of state property would
provide a "dependable and regular" revenue source for funding basic
education. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476,
522, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
5.

Order Invalidating Education Funding Cuts

Plaintiffs suggest the Court could invalidate legislation that makes
cuts to education funding.

Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47.

While the Court

unquestionably has authority to invalidate unconstitutional statutes,
Plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of any statute in their
complaint, CP 3-26. In the context of this litigation, therefore, it is far
from clear what legislation Plaintiffs suggest should be invalidated.
Perhaps relatedly, Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order enjoining
the Legislature from imposing "any more unfunded or underfunded
mandates" on schools. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 49. Putting aside the question
of how to define an "unfunded or underfunded mandate," this suggestion
lacks the precision required for a prospective injunction. 17

17

A court must precisely tailor a permanent injunction to prevent a specific
harm. Kitsap Cnty. v. Kev, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 135, 143, 720 P.2d 818 (1986). See also
CR 65(d) (order imposing injunction must describe in reasonable detail the acts enjoined
as well as the reasons supporting issuance of the injunction, above and beyond the
complaint or other documents).
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6.

Order Shutting Down the Public School System

Finally, Plaintiffs step into the deepest water by suggesting the
Court might shut down all public schools in Washington until such timeas
they are amply funded. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. This suggestion assumes
no education is preferable to the education students in Washington
currently are receiving.

In fact, it would most directly harm the very

persons-school children-Plaintiffs claim to be advocating for.
Plaintiffs have cited cases in which state courts have issued orders
temporarily enjoining their state from disbursing money to schools, but
none of those cases provide a persuasive rationale for applying that
remedy here. 18 Only one decision, Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 161,
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They cite Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Kan. Dist. Ct.,
Shawnee County, May 11, 2004) (unpublished Decision and Order Remedy), in which
"legislative leaders openly declared their defiance of the Court," ignored the court's
factual fmdings, and refused to take action in response to the court's order. 2004 WL
1094555 at *5. After surveying actions taken in other states (none of which had ordered
the shutdown of public schools), the trial court declared the funding statutes, which it
already had found unconstitutional, to be void as applied to the funding of public schools
and enjoined their use for distributing funds for public education. I d. at *11.
Significantly, the injunction was to take effect on June 30, while the schools were closed
for summer. Id. at *15. The Kansas Supreme Court stayed the injunction before it took
effect. Montoy v. State, No. 92,032 (May 19, 2004) (unpublished order) available at
http://www .kscourts. org/Court-Administration/News-Releases/schoolfinanceorder
20040519.pdf.
The decision in Hull v. Albrecht, 192 Ariz. 34, 960 P.2d 634 (1998), marked the
fourth time in four years that the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of school funding legislation. In its third attempt at compliance, the legislature adopted
an act establishing a new funding mechanism. The court found an "opt-out" provision in
the act would continue unconstitutional disparities in funding, held the act
unconstitutional, and invalidated it. Id. at 639. Invalidating the act left no mechanism for
distributing state funds to public schools; but rather than immediately enjoining the
distribution of funds, the court extended the time during which the state could distribute
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358 A.2d 457 (1976), actually closed the schools, and it did so for a few
days in the summer of 1976. That decision is one of dozens in four
decades of litigation over school funding and control in New Jersey. 19 In
response to earlier decisions, the legislature enacted a statute in 1975
which the New Jersey Supreme Court found to be constitutional if fully
funded. When the 1976 legislature did not fully fund it, a divided court
enjoined all public officers in New Jersey "from expending any funds for
the support of any free public school," with certain exceptions. Robinson,
70 N.J. at 160. The court lifted the injunction after the legislature adopted
an income tax to fund the statute. 20

funds to give the legislature additional time to respond. Id. at 640. The legislature
responded quickly by deleting the "opt-out" provision, and no bar on distributing funds
was ever imposed. Hull v. Albrecht, No. CV-98-0238-SA (July 20, 1998) (unpublished
Order), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/orders/scorder/1999_20020rders/
schorder. pdf.
Plaintiffs also cite a case involving unconstitutional conditions of confmement
that is not directly on point, and they erroneously characterize it. The court of appeals
affirmed a district court order closing a Boston jail if conditions were not remedied, but
stayed the effective date of the order for six months. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 1978). The order did not take effect because of a
consent judgment, which governed until the jail was completed. Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 372-77, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992).
The most recent decision appe~rs to be Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 20 A.3d
1018 (20 11) (Abbott XXI).
19

20

The order dissolving the injunction is not found in Westlaw, but is referenced
in subsequent decisions of New Jersey courts .. See, e.g., New Jersey Hasp. Ass'n v. New
Jersey State Dep't of Health, 249 N.J. Super. 194, 204, 592 A.2d 265 (App. Div. 1991)
(listing the cite as 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976); D.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Brunswick
Twp., 188 N.J. Super. 592, 605, 458 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1983) (listing the cite as 70 N.J.
465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976)).
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The Robinson court imposed the injunction over two extended
dissents, one of which laid out several reasons for exercising restraint in
fashioning a judicial remedy. Four of the reasons given proved prescient
for New Jersey and are relevant to all the sanctions Plaintiffs have
proposed here: (1) potential violation of separation of powers by intruding
into areas constitutionally delegated to the legislature; (2) placing in
jeopardy the court's "power of legitimacy"-"the power to command
acceptance and support from the community so as to render force
unnecessary, or necessary only upon a small scale against a few
recalcitrants"; (3) assuming a task of enforcement that may be beyond the
competence of the court for lack of supportive resources; (4) an
institutional inability to view the governmental problem in its entirety and
as a whole (i.e., without adequate information as to other public needs the
legislature balances).

Robinson, 70 N.J. at 162-64 (Mountain, J.,

dissenting) (quoting Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in
American Government 103-05 (1976)) ..

Plaintiffs here have not articulated how their goal of fully funding
education is advanced by an order enjoining any disbursement of state
funds to public schools in Washington.

Presumably, they believe the

pressure will be so great that the Legislature will have no choice but to act
and to do so quickly. But that is a dangerous strategy. If the remedy fails

24

and schools are closed, it is schoolchildren who are harmed most directly.
Moreover, those put at greatest risk of harm are those who have the fewest
educational alternatives-wealthy parents can arrange for educational
alternatives during a period of school closure, but such options are seldom
available to families of modest means.

Plaintiffs' suggested remedy

contravenes the constitutional ideal they purport to uphold.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The State shares the Court's goal of achieving full compliance with
article IX, and the Legislature continues to make progress toward meeting
the 2018 deadline this Court established.

Plaintiffs' arguments to the

contrary are unfounded and unproductive. No sanction is necessary to
compel continued progress.
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